Title : A comparative study of the predicative existence in transcendent theology and Kant’s philosophy and analytics

Student : Masud Sadeghi

supervisor : Dr. Askari Soleymani Amiri

Advisor : Dr. Mohsen qomi/ Dr. YarAli kordFirozjayi

Grade : PHD

Years : 2014

Abstract:

In Islamic philosophy, the question of the predication of existence has been raised before Farabi.     

This question was later raised more seriously.

Muslim philosophers challenged the predication of existence through subordinate rule.

They believe that if there is a predicate on mere existence, a vicious circle or infinite causes regression will occur.

In western philosophy, too, the predication of existence has been questioned and denied. 

Hume initiates the topic of the denial ofpredicative existence, but this denial is more reminiscent of Kant’s name.  

He says that the existence of a predicate is not real.

The real predicate is to increase the meaning of the subject, but because it is not, it merely acts as an interface.

After denying the predicative existence, Kant distorts the existential arguments in proving the existence of God, because in these arguments the existence of a true predicate is considered.

He also considers existential propositions to be synthetic.

 Analytical philosophers have also denied the nature of existence.

They consider existence to be a secondary predicate.

The second degree predicate is a predicate that is carried only on concepts and not on individuals.

In the analysis of analytic philosophers of existential propositions, existence is placed in the position of a quantifier, so they believe that existence is nothing more than a quantifier.

They argue that if existence is predicated on individuals, their existential propositions will cause their own, the same, and their own negative.

In their view, the debate of a predicate is presented as a logical discussion and a linguistic discussion.

By standardizing Sadra’s ontology, especially his discussions of the priority of existence, the mere existence, and reverse predicate, it is concluded that Kant and his analytical philosophers are not correct.

There are three main complications in Kant’s idea.

First, his criterion of true and untrue predicates is a credit criterion against which other criteria can be met.

Second, existential propositions are an abstract synthesis, not a pure synthesis;

Third, based on the originality of existence and its substantial motion, it is existence that can express identity as an increasing feature.

The main argument of analytic philosophers is also distorted because existential propositions imply the proof of an object.

Additonally, Sadra’s theory of the specialty of existence makes it clear that existence must really be predicated upon individuals.

The definition of predicative existence also reveals that the argument of predicative existence is a philosophical-logical argument.

But the existential argument is distorted not because existence is not predicated

but because of the confusion between the concept and the instance of the aseity.

Key Words: predicative existence, the existence of an interface, a true predicate, Kant’s philosophy, transcendenttheology, Analytical philosophy, the mere existence, reverse predicate,  existential argument, a first-order predicate, a secondary predicate.